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Growth, Structural Change, and Poverty Reduction: 
Evidence from India1 
 
Rana Hasan2, Sneha Lamba3, and Abhijit Sen Gupta4 
 
We examine the relationship between growth in labor productivity and poverty reduction through 
the lens of changes in the structure of output and employment. Combining state-level data from 
India on poverty with state-level data on output and employment for 11 production sectors over 
1987–2009, we find that the movement of workers from lower to higher productivity sector is an 
important channel through which increases in aggregate productivity translate into poverty 
reduction. We also find that the importance of this channel of productivity growth, termed 
structural change by recent literature, varies across states. Exploratory analysis reveals that 
indicators of financial development, business regulations that promote competition and flexible 
labor regulations are associated with larger reallocations of labor from lower to higher 
productivity sectors. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that a better investment 
climate is not only good for business, it is also an important means for making growth more pro-
poor in a labor abundant country. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. After 3 decades of generally low growth, the Indian economy experienced a growth 
acceleration that started in the 1980s. Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, only 
1.4% annually from the 1950s through 1970s, accelerated steadily—from average annual 
growth rates of 3.5% in the 1980s, to 3.7% in the 1990s, and 5.5% in the new millennium. While 
a slowdown in growth since early 2011 has led to a vigorous debate about the Indian economy’s 
“growth potential” and its ability to sustain growth rates of around 6% and higher (in per capita 
terms) for long stretches of time, a more enduring debate has been about the inclusiveness of 
India’s growth. 
 
2. What has been the impact of India’s growth on poverty? What factors explain the 
strength of the growth–poverty relationship in India? What, if anything, can be done to make the 
growth process more effective in reducing poverty? This paper examines these questions 
through the lens of structural transformation—i.e., changes in an economy’s structure of output 
and employment.5 Such an approach is important since, although there are many causes  
of poverty, ultimately the poor are poor because the work they do earns them so little. 
Consequently, understanding the relationships between growth, changes in the structure of 
output and employment, and poverty reduction is crucial for policymaking. 
 
3. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts by providing a snapshot of the 
empirical relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction in India since the 1980s. 
(A detailed discussion of data and variable construction is provided in the Appendix.) The 
snapshot indicates that while growth in India has been associated with an unambiguous decline 
in poverty, the extent of poverty reduction in India has been considerably less than in other high-
growth economies in Asia. The section then considers the proximate factors that can explain  
the relatively weak link between growth and poverty reduction in India. Drawing upon previous 
literature and some simple analysis of the evolving sectoral composition of output and 
employment in India, it is noted that the impact of growth on poverty is influenced by which 
production sectors drive growth. This is because in India, as is the case in developing countries 
more generally, sectors differ vastly in terms of their (labor) productivity.6 Of course, sectors  
also differ in terms of how many people they employ. Since productivity influences earnings, 
differential performance of sectors in terms of growth in output and productivity will have 
important implications for workers’ earnings and thus poverty.7 In general, growth will have a 
larger impact on poverty when the former is driven by increases in productivity in sectors that 
employ a large proportion of an economy’s workers. However, growth can also be driven by a 
reallocation of workers from low productivity (and low earning) sectors to higher productivity 
(higher earning) sectors.8 Growth that is driven by such a reallocation can also be expected to 
reduce poverty. 
 
                                               
5
 Structural transformation in an economy is usually thought to encompass three processes: (i) changes 
in sectoral composition of output; (ii) changes in sectoral composition of employment; and (iii) changes 
in the rural–urban composition of output and employment. Our focus in this paper is on the first two 
processes only. 
6
 McMillan and Rodrik, 2011. 
7
 Increases in productivity may also lead to a reduction in the price of output. In this case, the 
relationship between productivity and poverty would run through the gains the poor experience as 
consumers of a product whose (relative) price is falling. Of course, the significance of this effect will 
depend on the importance of the product in the consumption basket of the poor.  
8
 McMillan and Rodrik, 2011. 
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4. Section 3 uses state-level data on poverty and productivity across 11 broad sectors of 
production from 1987 to 2009 to explore the impact of aggregate labor productivity growth and 
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its components—within-sector productivity growth and productivity growth due to reallocation of 
labor—on poverty reduction.9 A key finding is that the movement of workers from lower 
productivity to higher productivity sectors is an important channel through which increases in 
productivity translate into poverty reduction. Significantly, the relative importance of this 
phenomena—which we call structural change10 and which should be distinguished from the 
broader concept of structural transformation—varies across states. 
 
5. Some exploratory regression analysis indicates that the extent of structural change 
responds to policies and the institutional environment. In particular, states with better functioning 
credit markets and pro-competitive regulations are more likely to see greater reallocation  
of labor from lower productivity to higher productivity sectors. Section 4 concludes with a 
discussion of the policy implications of the findings, including what types of policy changes may 
be needed for growth to have a bigger impact on poverty reduction. 
 
 
II. GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN INDIA 
 
6. After 3 decades of low and volatile growth, India experienced an acceleration in 
economic growth in the 1980s.11 As Figure 1 shows, prior to the 1980s, growth in GDP per 
capita (in terms of 5-year moving averages) tended to fluctuate between 1% and 2%.12 
However, growth rates started increasing in the early 1980s and continued to do so well into the 
2000s. Thus, while GDP per capita grew by an average of around 1.2% annually in the 1960s 
and 1970s, each subsequent decade has seen a steady climb in growth rates—from average 
annual growth rates of 3.5% in the 1980s, to 3.7% in the 1990s, to 5.5% in the new millennium. 
Table 1 shows that India’s growth acceleration has put it among the fastest-growing economies 
in  
the world.’ 
 
7. Viewed from the lens of poverty and household expenditure data (on which 
computations of poverty in India are based), growth in India has been inclusive. As Figure 2 
indicates, poverty rates in India have declined for a variety of poverty lines, national and 
international. The insensitivity of trends in poverty to different poverty lines is not surprising 
when we consider that per capita expenditures adjusted for both temporal and spatial price 
differentials have increased for every statistical percentile group of individuals in India (Figure 
3). Thus, regardless of the poverty line used, it is clear that the proportion of people living in 
                                               
9
 Our state-level analysis is based on data from 15 major Indian states using pre-2000 boundaries of 
three large states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar (including what is now Jharkhand), Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh (including what is now Chhattisgarh), Maharashtra, 
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh (including what is now Uttarakhand) and West 
Bengal. 
10
 Following the terminology of McMillan and Rodrik (2011).  
11
 The exact timing of India’s growth acceleration and its causes are the subject of debate. For example, 
while Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005) have emphasized the role of "pro-business" reforms of the 
early 1980s, and thus downplayed the importance of the dramatic trade liberalization and industrial 
policy delicensing that took place in 1991, Panagariya (2008) has argued that unsustainable increases 
in public expenditures and foreign borrowings were important drivers of growth in the 1980s, and thus 
that without the reforms of 1991, India’s growth acceleration of the 1980s would have proved to be 
short-lived. 
12
 The figure considers a five-year moving average of annual growth rates of GDP per capita since there 
is a lot of year-to-year fluctuation in growth rates, particularly in the earlier years when India’s economy 
was especially influenced by the often fickle monsoons. 
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poverty has been declining. Indeed, the data indicate that even the number of extremely poor in 
India has begun to decline since the mid-2000s (or even mid-1990s, depending on the particular 
poverty line used). Thus, while the number of poor (based on the Expert Group 2009 poverty 
lines) increased marginally from 403.7 million in 1993–1994 to 407.2 million in 2004–05, the 
number of poor had fallen to 354.7 million in 2009–2010.13 This is in sharp contrast to  
the situation in the 1950s and 1960s when the number of poor was expanding rapidly in India  
(in terms of a variant of the national poverty line used by Datt and Ravallion).14 Based on  
this alternative poverty line, the number of poor only began declining after some point in the 
mid-1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: International Comparison of Economic Growth 
Region Period GDP GDP per Worker 
India 1960–1980 3.4   1.3 
1980–2004 5.8   3.7 
PRC 1960–1980 4.0   1.8 
1980–2003 9.5   7.8 
South Asia 1960–1980 3.6   1.4 
1980–2003 5.5   3.4 
East Asia less PRC 1960–1980 7.0   4.0 
1980–2003 6.1   3.7 
Latin America 1960–1980 5.7   2.7 
1980–2003 2.0 –0.6 
Africa 1960–1980 4.4   1.9 
1980–2003 2.2 –0.6 
Middle East 1960–1980 5.4   3.2 
1980–2003 3.8   0.8 
Industrial Countries 1960–1980 4.2   2.9 
1980–2003 2.6   1.6 
                                               
13
 Press Note on Poverty Estimates, 2009-2010, Planning Commission, Government of India, March 
2012. 
14
  Datt and Ravallion, 2011. 
Figure 1: India’s Growth Performance: Five-Year Moving Averages of Gross Domestic Product 
per Capita, 1951–1952 to 2011–2012 
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Notes: The independent variables are in annualized rate of change terms.  Specifications (1)–(3) estimate the 
coefficient for all the time periods under consideration, i.e. the periods 1987–1993, 1993–2004 and 2004–2009, while 
specifications (4)–(6) estimates coefficients for only post-liberalization years, i.e., the time periods 1993–2004 and 
2004–2009. All values are in annualized percentage terms.  t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2007).  
 
Figure 2: Poverty Decline in India Using Different Poverty Lines 
 
Source: Government of India (2012) and PovcalNet. 
 
Figure 3: Growth in Per Capita Expenditures by Percentiles of the Population,  
1993–1994 to 2009–2010 
 
Note: Computed using Uniform Recall Period monthly per capita expenditure from the National Sample Survey 
Organisation’s Consumer Expenditure Survey data and adjusting expenditures for spatial and inter-temporal 
differences in prices using the implicit consumer price index generated from the Expert Group (2009) poverty lines. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
8. The pace of poverty reduction has, however, been relatively slow in India. As Figure 4 
shows, India’s pace of poverty reduction has been clearly slower than that of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, and Viet Nam. Interestingly, differentials in GDP growth 
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rates do not explain the differential performance in poverty reduction. Consider the following 
elasticities of poverty reduction to GDP growth reported by Ravallion,15 –0.8 for PRC (1981–
2005) and –0.3 for India (1993–2005). These numbers tell us that for a 1% increase in GDP in 
PRC, there was a 0.8% reduction in the poverty rate. In India, on the other hand, the poverty 
rate declined by only 0.3% for every 1% increase in GDP. Since actual growth in PRC was also 
much higher than in India, the net effect of growth on poverty was that much greater. 
 
Note: Poverty Head Count Ratios are based on the “$ 1.25 a day” at 2005 Purchasing Power Parity poverty lines. 
Source: Computed using PovcalNet, the online tool for poverty measurement developed by the Development 
Research Group of the World Bank. 
 
9. Significantly, Datt and Ravallion’s analysis of the growth–poverty relationship in India 
from 1951 to 2006 indicates that the pace of poverty reduction failed to picked up after the 
reforms of 1991 (although it must be noted that more recently released data reveal that the pace 
of poverty reduction has distinctly picked up between 2004 and 2009).16 Since economic growth 
has been faster in the post-1991 period, the elasticity of poverty reduction to growth in GDP, in 
fact, declined a little if data until 2006 are considered. 
 
10. Why has growth in India not led to faster poverty reduction? There are several proximate 
factors that can explain the relatively weak link between growth and poverty reduction in India. 
First, India’s ‘initial conditions’ in terms of human development—encompassing nutritional, 
health, and educational status—have been weaker. Given the findings of Datt and Ravallion that 
                                               
15
  Ravallion, 2009. 
16
  Datt and Ravallion, 2011. 
Figure 4: Poverty Reduction in India as Compared to Selected Economies 
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Indian states with better initial levels of human development had higher growth elasticities of 
poverty reduction, the growth-poverty linkage in India might be weaker on account of its more 
limited progress on the nutrition, health, and education front as compared to many East and 
Southeast Asian countries.17 Second, growth has tended to be lower in states that account for a 
large proportion of India’s poor. As Figure 5 shows, among Indian states that accounted for 
more than 3.5% each of India’s total poor in 1993, there has been a clear tendency for states 
with greater numbers of poor to grow more slowly from 1993 to 2009. Similarly, growth in rural 
India, which has accounted for between 81.5% and 78% of India’s poor over 1993 and 2009, 
has been considerably slower than growth in urban India. Estimates from the High Powered 
Expert Committee (HPEC) indicate that the faster growth of urban areas has resulted in their 
contribution to GDP increasing from 51.7% in 1999–2000 to around 62%  
in 2009–2010.18 Interestingly, however, this differential growth between rural and urban areas 
may not have as strong a role in explaining the relatively weak growth–poverty relationship  
post-1991 as it had prior to 1991. Datt and Ravallion find that, whereas rural economic growth 
was more important than urban economic growth for overall poverty reduction, urban economic 
growth has begun having a significant impact on poverty reduction in the post-1991 period.19 
 
Figure 5: Initial Incidence of Poverty and Economic Growth Across States 
 
Notes: The fitted line is based on states with more than 3.5% of India’s total poor in 1993–1994. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
11. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the sectoral composition of India’s growth seems 
to have been such that it has generated relatively fewer productive employment opportunities 
for the poor. Consider Figure 6, which describes the sectoral contribution to  
GDP growth in India from 1980 to 2011. Three features are apparent. First, the contribution of 
agriculture to aggregate growth has been declining over time. Second, the main driver of  
growth in India has been service industries such as finance, insurance, and real estate; 
transport services and communications; and wholesale and retail trade. Third, while growth in 
manufacturing (and construction) has also played an important role, this has been on account of 
                                               
17
  Datt and Ravallion, 1999. 
18
  HPEC, 2011. 
19
  Datt and Ravallion, 2011. 
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the registered or formal manufacturing sector; the contribution of unregistered or informal 
manufacturing sector to growth has been low and unchanged over time.  
 
12. In and of itself, the first of these features is not problematic. Indeed, it is natural for 
agriculture’s contribution to growth to decline as an economy develops. The problem comes in 
when we recognize that the structure of employment in India has changed far less than the 
structure of output. In particular, the share of agriculture in total employment declined from 68% 
in 1983 to 51% in 2009. Given that the share of agriculture in total output declined from 37.1% 
to 14.7% over the same period, the implication is that far too many of India’s workers have 
remained in a sector that has displayed insufficient productivity growth.20 Similarly, while the 
rapid growth of services relative to industry or manufacturing is also not problematic per se 
(though it does go against the pattern experienced by high-performing East Asian economies 
that have also been very successful in poverty reduction), the lackluster growth of India’s 
unregistered manufacturing sector—which employs around 80% of manufacturing workers  
and tends to be very labor intensive in contrast to the skill- and/or capital-intensive registered 
manufacturing sector—is. In particular, it suggests that employment opportunities in a 
nonagricultural sector (widely believed to have considerable potential for absorbing less skilled 
workers at higher productivity than agriculture) expanded at a slow pace.21  
 
Figure 6: Sectoral Contribution to Gross Domestic Product Growth, Selected Periods 
 
AGR = Agriculture and Allied Activities, CONS = Construction, CSP = Community, Social and Personal Services, 
FIRE = Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, GOV = Public Administration; Government Services, MIN = Mining and 
                                               
20
  Papola and Sahu, 2012. 
21
  Using data on Indian poverty and production from 1951 to 1991, Ravallion and Datt (1996) find output 
growth in the primary and tertiary sectors to be poverty reducing. Growth in the secondary sector is 
found to have no impact on poverty reduction. These patterns show up both in the aggregate as well 
as for rural and urban India, separately. A consistent set of results is obtained by Hasan, Quibria, and 
Kim (2003) who use cross-country data and find that poverty reduction in South Asia has been more 
closely associated with growth in the primary and tertiary sectors—unlike the case of East Asia where 
the growth in the secondary sector has been an important driver of poverty reduction. Both findings are 
consistent with the point being made here. That is, while India’s manufacturing sector grew, its 
expansion was driven by the skill-and/or capital-intensive registered manufacturing sector. The labor-
intensive unregistered manufacturing sector experienced limited growth. Since the fortunes of the poor 
are likely to be more intimately linked with the performance of unregistered manufacturing given the 
dualism in Indian manufacturing, it would not be surprising to find that growth in manufacturing, driven 
by an expansion of registered manufacturing, to not be particularly poverty reducing.  
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Quarrying, PU = Public Utilities, REG = Registered Manufacturing, TSC = Transport, Storage and Communications, 
UNREG = Unregistered Manufacturing, and WRT = Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels. 
Notes: Computed using national accounts data from the Central Statistical Organisation. GDP and sectoral growth 
rates are averages over the 10-year period reported.  
Source: Authors’ Estimates. 
 
13. Put differently, India’s changing structure of production, characterized by the declining 
importance of agriculture, would have been more poverty reducing had it been accompanied by 
larger increases in agricultural productivity and larger changes in the structure of employment 
with labor moving out of agriculture to higher productivity sectors.22 Figure 7, which uses India-
wide data from 2009 to describe how India’s workers are distributed across sectors along with 
the levels of sectoral labor productivity (relative to the national average), shows this quite 
clearly.23 As may be seen, around half of India’s workers are engaged in the agriculture sector. 
Given the extremely low productivity of the sector—only 29% of average productivity 
nationally—the implication is that a near majority of India’s workers are trapped in a vicious 
cycle of low productivity and low earnings. For growth to be associated with rapid poverty 
reduction, India would have to raise productivity in the agriculture sector on the one hand, and 
ensure that job opportunities come up in higher productivity sectors elsewhere.  
 
Figure 7: Employment Shares and Labor Productivity Differentials across Sectors, 
 
AGR = Agriculture and Allied Activities, CONST = Construction, CSP = Community, Social and Personal Services, 
FIRE = Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, GOV = Public Administration; Government Services, MIN = Mining  
and Quarrying, PU = Public Utilities, REGMFG = Registered Manufacturing, TSC = Transport, Storage and 
Communications, UNREG = Unregistered Manufacturing, and WRT = Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and 
Hotels. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Central Statistical Organisation and National Sample Survey Organization 
reports. 
 
14. Which sectors will these be? As Figure 7 reveals, there are certainly sectors in which 
productivity levels are very high. The difficulty is that many of these sectors—such as finance, 
                                               
22
  In their analysis of the effects of agricultural productivity on poverty in India, Datt and Ravallion (1998) 
find increases in agricultural productivity to be associated with lower poverty through several channels 
including higher yields, an expansion of employment opportunities, increases in wages, and/or 
declines in relative food prices.  
23
  Output data is from the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) while employment data is drawn from 
the employment-unemployment surveys of the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). 
Information on usual principal status of individuals is used for determining employment across states 
and industries. 
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insurance, and real estate; mining; and public utilities—have low potential for generating jobs on 
a large scale for semiskilled workers. One sector with considerable untapped potential for 
generating reasonably high productivity jobs is manufacturing. Unfortunately, employment in this 
sector has been fairly stable at around 12%–15%. The policy reasons behind India’s pattern of 
growth in output and employment, and thus the relationship between growth and poverty, is 
something we will come back to later in this paper. 
 
 
III. PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
15. The foregoing discussion suggests that the impact of aggregate growth on poverty 
depends on the sectoral composition of growth for two reasons. First, production sectors differ 
vastly in terms of their productivity. Since earnings are influenced by productivity, this differential 
has implications for cross-sector earnings. Indeed, as Figure 8 shows, average wages tend  
to be higher (lower) in sectors with higher (lower) productivity.24 Second, employment shares 
vary considerably across sectors. The implication is that differential performance of sectors 
should have implications for the extent of new employment opportunities generated, earnings, 
and thus poverty. 
 
Figure 8: Average Wages and Productivity across Sectors, 2004–2005 
 
Notes: Average daily wages and annual labor productivity are expressed in nominal 2004–2005 rupees.  
AGR = Agriculture and Allied Activities; CONST = Construction; CSP = Community, Social and Personal Services; 
FIRE = Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; GOV = Public Administration, Government Services; MFG = Manufacturing; 
MIN = Mining and Quarrying; PU = Public Utilities; REGMFG = Registered Manufacturing; TSC = Transport, Storage and 
Communications; and WRT = Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on National Sample Survey Organisation reports 
 
16. An implication of Figure 7 is that increases in aggregate growth need not stem only from 
improvements in productivity within a given production sector; they can also arise from a 
                                               
24
  Our measure of average wages is derived from the NSSO’s employment-unemployment survey of 
2004–2005 for the 15 major states. In particular, we took data on weekly earnings and number of half 
days worked (over a 7-day period) by regular and casual wage employees to calculate daily wages for 
workers. These were averaged over each of the production sectors we work with in this paper. 
However, as the survey data does not allow us to distinguish between unregistered and registered 
manufacturing, we consider a single, consolidated manufacturing sector for computing both average 
wages as well as average labor productivity by sector. 
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reallocation of resources, especially employment, from lower productivity to higher productivity 
sectors.25 In fact, in their analysis of productivity growth and its drivers in developing countries 
from around the world, McMillan and Rodrik note an important feature that distinguishes  
the experience of Asia, the region with the highest increases in aggregate productivity, from 
Africa and Latin America. While all three regions have experienced increases in within-sector 
productivity, it is mainly in Asia that these have additionally been accompanied by a reallocation 
of employment from lower productivity to higher productivity sectors. The result has been fairly 
high increases in aggregate productivity. In contrast, in Africa and Latin America, employment 
changes toward higher productivity sectors have been minor (or even actually moved to lower 
productivity sectors). One reason for this is that the expansion of aggregate output and 
productivity in Latin America and Africa has been often driven by increases in productivity within 
highly capital-intensive sectors (for example, mining).  
 
17. The implications for poverty reduction follow quite clearly. Growth will have a larger 
impact on poverty when it is driven by sectors that employ a large proportion of an economy’s 
rank and file workers (such as agriculture). However, growth can also be driven by a 
reallocation of workers from low productivity (and low earnings) sectors to higher productivity 
(higher earnings) sectors. Growth that is driven by such a reallocation should also be poverty 
reducing.   
 
18. In what follows, we use data on poverty, employment, and productivity for 15 states 
(based on pre-2000 state definitions, as noted earlier, and spanning 1987–2009) to explore how 
aggregate (labor) productivity, the proximate driver of economic growth, affects poverty. 
Following the work of McMillan and Rodrik, we break down states’ aggregate productivity 
growth into two components: within-sector productivity growth and that due to structural change 
or reallocation of labor. The relationships are captured by the following equation:  
 
     = ∑                 ∑                       (1) 
 
where      is the change in productivity at the economy wide level. The first term on the right 
hand side of the equation reflects the weighted sum of productivity growth within the individual 
production sectors, with the weights,       , being the share of employment at the beginning of 
the period. The second term indicates the change in labor productivity due to reallocation of 
employment across sectors. McMillan and Rodrik refer to this term as ‘structural change’.26  
 
A. Productivity Growth across States 
 
19. We first examine how productivity and its two components have evolved across India’s 
major states from 1987 to 2009. The bars of Figure 9 present the productivity growth numbers 
expressed in annualized growth rates.27 The numbers above the bar denote the ranking of 
states in terms of how important structural change has been as a driver of growth. As may  
be seen from the figure, both within-sector productivity growth and structural change have 
                                               
25
  This implication is highlighted by McMillan and Rodrik. 
26
  McMillan and Rodrik, 2011. 
27
  These are computed as follows: First, we calculate the annual growth rate of overall productivity. Next, 
we compute what proportion of the total productivity change in absolute terms is accounted for by 
structural transformation and within-sector productivity (i.e., and, respectively). These proportions are 
then multiplied to the annual growth rate of overall productivity to obtain the annualised growth rate of 
structural transformation and within-sector productivity growth, respectively. This closely follows the 
methodology used by McMillian and Rodrik as explained by Ahsan and Mitra (2012). 
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contributed positively to aggregate labor productivity growth in all states, although the extent  
of the contribution of the two components have varied significantly across the states. The 
contribution of structural change to aggregate labor productivity is highest in Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, and Haryana (as may be seen from the number above) and lowest in Punjab, 
Bihar, and West Bengal.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Within-Sector Productivity Growth and Structural Change in Indian States, 1987–2009 
 
Notes: All values are in annualized percentage terms. States are sorted in order of the highest magnitude of  total 
productivity growth. The numbers  above the bars indicates how each state ranks with respect to the proportion of 
structural change in total productivity growth, i.e the length of the black bar. 
Source: Author estimates based on Central Statistical Organisation reports. 
 
B. The Impact of Productivity Growth on Poverty Reduction 
 
20. We next consider the experience of states with regard to poverty reduction. Figure 10 
ranks states according to their annual rates of poverty reduction. The southern states of Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh have the highest rates of poverty reduction (4% 
per annum or higher), while the states with the lowest rates of poverty reduction are Madhya 
Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab and Assam (less than 2% per annum). Figures 11 and 12 show that 
both a higher pace of structural change (upper panel), as well as a higher pace of within-sector 
productivity growth (lower panel) are positively associated with a higher pace of poverty 
reduction. Of course, the relationships are not watertight. As may be seen, given the rates of 
structural change and within-sector productivity growth that Kerala has experienced, the extent 
of poverty reduction in the state has been far higher than what the simple linear relationship 
between poverty reduction and the two components of productivity growth would suggest.28 To 
                                               
28
  Whether Kerala’s superior poverty reduction is on account of its superior human capital endowments à 
la Ravallion and Datt (1999) or mechanisms related to transfers (either public or private, such as 
through remittances from Kerala’s diaspora spread across India and abroad) cannot be addressed by 
the data here. 
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a lesser extent, Madhya Pradesh also emerges as an outlier, though in a direction opposite to 
that of Kerala. In this state, the extent of poverty reduction has been considerably less than 
what the pace of structural change and within-sector productivity growth would suggest.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Annual Rate of Poverty Reduction in Indian States, 1987–2009 
 
Notes: All values are in annualized percentage terms. States are sorted in order of highest magnitude of annual rate 
of poverty reduction.  
Source: Authors’ estimates based on National Sample Survey Organisation reports. 
 
Figures 11 and 12: Productivity and Poverty Reduction in Indian States, 1987–2009 
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Figure 11: Structural Change and Poverty Reduction (1987–2009) 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates 
 
Figure 12: Within Sector Productivity Growth and Poverty Reduction 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates 
 
21. To probe a bit further into the relationship between productivity growth, its two 
components, and poverty we carry out some simple regression analysis involving the following 
regression specification: 
 
, , , ,j t t k j t t kP X          (2) 
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where             and           are the annual rates of change in poverty headcount ratios and 
productivity growth for state j over (t-k)th and tth years. 
 
22. Table 2 describes the results of the regression analysis. These indicate that the higher is 
overall productivity growth, as well as its two components—productivity growth occurring due to 
the reallocation of labor (i.e., the “structural change” term) and “within-sector productivity 
growth”—the faster is the pace of poverty reduction. This holds for the full time period examined 
(i.e., 1987–2009; columns 1–3) as well as for only the post-liberalization years, 1993–2009 
(columns 4–6). To understand the magnitude of the estimated relationship between productivity 
growth and poverty reduction, consider column (1). The estimated coefficient on the productivity 
growth term implies that a one percentage point increase in the annual rate of productivity 
growth leads to a 0.64 percentage point increase in the annual rate of poverty reduction. Taking 
the case of Andhra Pradesh, which experienced an increase of productivity growth from 4.6% 
per annum over 1993–2004 to 9% per annum over 2004–2009, the estimated coefficient 
suggests that Andhra Pradesh’s poverty rate should have declined from 29.7% in 2004 to 
22.01% by 2009. Had there been no increase in productivity growth, so that the latter remained 
at 4.6% per annum, the poverty rate by 2009 would be around 25.6%. As it happens, an 
increase in productivity of 4.4 percentage points per annum took place from 2004–2009 and 
Andhra Pradesh’s headcount ratio ended up at 21.1% by 2009, a little lower than if productivity 
growth were the only factor determining the extent of poverty reduction. 
 
 
Table 2: Effect of Total Productivity Growth and its Components on Poverty 
 
Dependent Variable: Annual Rate of Change in Poverty Rates 
All Years (1987–2009) 
Post Liberalization Years  
(1993–2009) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant –0.0027 –0.0058 –0.0279*** 0.0030 –0.0009 –0.0265*** 
  [–0.399] [–0.803] [–5.893] [0.358] [–0.098] [–4.011] 
       
Average Labor  –0.6409***   –0.7183***   
Productivity Growth [–5.439]   [–5.381]   
       
Within Sector   –0.6989***   –0.8109***  
Productivity Growth  [–4.526]   [–4.455]  
       
Structural Change   –0.7784**   –0.9546** 
    [–2.597]   [–2.541] 
       
Observations 45 45 45 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.4076 0.3227 0.1356 0.5084 0.4148 0.1874 
Notes: The independent variables are in annualized rate of change terms.  Specifications (1)–(3) estimate the 
coefficient for all the time periods under consideration, i.e.  the periods 1987–1993, 1993-2004 and 2004-2009, while 
specifications (4)–(6) estimates coefficients for only post-liberalization years, i.e., the time periods 1993-2004 and 
2004–2009. All values are in annualized percentage terms. t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ Estimates. 
 
23. Interestingly, all productivity growth coefficients are larger in the post-liberalization 
period. Also, the coefficient for the “structural change” term is larger in absolute terms than the 
“within-sector productivity growth” term for both time periods, strongly suggesting that the 
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reallocation of labor from lower productivity to higher productivity sectors is an important means 
through which growth reduces poverty.  
 
24. Indeed, a closer look at the drivers of aggregate productivity growth among states  
with strong and weak performance on poverty reduction is instructive. Of the states where the 
poverty rate declined by at least 4% per annum over 1987–2009 (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh), all four performed well on the structural change component of 
aggregate productivity growth relative to most other states. Their relative performance on the 
within-sector component is more mixed. The starkest case is that of Karnataka, which had the 
second largest structural change component among the 15 states but experienced within-sector 
productivity growth that was one of the weakest (3rd lowest).29 Among the weak performers on 
poverty reduction—i.e., states where the poverty rate declined by less than 2% per annum over 
1987–2009 (Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, and Assam)—the situation is somewhat converse. 
For example, while Punjab ranked favorably in terms of within-sector productivity growth 
(among the top 3 states), it experienced the second lowest amount of structural change. 
Similarly, while Bihar’s within-sector productivity growth was middling (rank 7 out of 15), it had 
the third lowest structural change term.30  
 
25. Figure 13 allows us to delve deeper into how individual sector experiences vis-à-vis the 
two components of productivity growth may be shaping the broader productivity growth–poverty 
reduction relationship. The figure displays by state, the extent of structural change and within-
sector productivity growth in each of the 11 production sectors considered in this paper. As per 
equation (1), negative values for structural change in any given sector imply a reduction in its 
share in total state employment; negative values for within-sector productivity growth  
imply a reduction in sectoral labor productivity between 1987 and 2009. Production sectors 
appear across states in the figure based on (ascending) order of state- and sector-specific labor 
productivity in 2009.  
 
                                               
29
  The relative rankings of the structural change and within-sector productivity growth components for 
each of the four states are, respectively: 5 out of 15 and 10 out of 15 for Kerala; 3 out of 15 and 4 out 
of 15 for Tamil Nadu; 2 out of 15 and 13 out of 15 for Karnataka; and 4 out of 15 and 6 out of 15 for 
Andhra Pradesh. 
30
  The relative rankings of the structural change and within-sector productivity growth components for 
each of the four states are, respectively: 9 out of 15 and 11 out of 15 for Madhya Pradesh; 13 out of 15 
and 7 out of 15 for Bihar; 14 out of 15 and 3 out of 15 for Punjab; and 15 out of 15 and 15 out of 15 for 
Assam. 
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Figure 13: Productivity Growth Decomposition by State and Sector: 1987–2009 
 
A = Agriculture and Allied Activities; B = Mining and Quarrying; C = Public Utilities; D = Construction; E = Wholesale 
and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels; F = Transport, Storage, and Communications; G = Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate; H = Government Services; I = Community, Social and Personal Services; J = Registered Manufacturing, 
and K = Unregistered Manufacturing. 
Source:  
 
26. Focusing on the cases of Bihar, Karnataka, and Punjab, the following salient features 
may be noted. First, while labor reallocated out of agriculture in Bihar—the state’s lowest 
productivity sector (as in 11 other states, the exceptions being in Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, and 
West Bengal)—it seems to have been primarily to relatively low productivity construction sector 
activities.31 At the same time, several high productivity sectors saw declines in employment 
shares (which may be inferred from the negative values of the bars representing structural 
change). Interestingly, registered manufacturing was one of these latter sectors. Not only was it 
Bihar’s highest productivity sector in 2009, it also showed the largest within-sector productivity 
increases over 1987–2009. In conjunction with the fact that unregistered manufacturing in  
Bihar displayed negligible increases in both of the two components of aggregate productivity 
(the third set of bars from the left), and that within-sector productivity in agriculture increased,  
a fairly plausible narrative for the weak response of poverty to aggregate productivity growth  
                                               
31
  As in almost every other state (the exception of Punjab), labor productivity in Bihar’s construction 
sector is higher than that in agriculture. However, the agriculture–construction sector differential in 
productivity is among the lowest in the case of Bihar. Coupled with the fact that the level of agricultural 
productivity in Bihar is among the lowest in the 15 states, we consider here (only Madhya Pradesh’s 
was lower in 2009), the relatively low differential in productivity between the two sectors is probably an 
important reason for the shift of employment from agriculture to construction in Bihar to not be 
particularly poverty reducing. 
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in Bihar would include the state’s inability to generate dynamism in modern, labor-intensive 
manufacturing.  
 
27. Second, as in the case of Bihar, Karnataka experienced reallocation of employment out 
of agriculture. To the extent that some of this employment moved into the second lowest 
productivity sector (unregistered manufacturing), it did so to a sector that was experiencing 
some improvements in within-sector productivity (certainly much more so than the construction 
sector in Bihar). Moreover, the employment share of unregistered manufacturing itself declined 
so that overall employment shares should have moved unambiguously to significantly higher 
productivity sectors that would have pulled people out of poverty. Two other striking differences 
from the case of Bihar are the fact that the high productivity registered manufacturing sector  
not only experienced a relatively high degree of within-sector productivity growth but also  
an increase in its share of the state’s employment, and that the highest productivity sector 
(encompassing finance, insurance, and real estate services) contributed significantly to the total 
structural change in the state. While one usually thinks of these sectors as mainly generating 
employment opportunities for high skilled (and therefore nonpoor) workers, recent work has 
begun to identify linkages between the growth of modern services sectors and employment 
opportunities for less skilled workers.32  
 
28. Finally, in the case of Punjab—which experienced weak poverty reduction like Bihar 
(albeit starting with initially low poverty rates)—it is interesting to note that although the share of 
agriculture in state employment declined as elsewhere, agriculture has not been the lowest 
productivity sector. In fact, three other sectors had lower productivity than agriculture. Moreover, 
employment shares in two of these sectors increased (i.e., construction and wholesale as well 
as retail trade, hotels, and restaurants). Given these patterns, it is not surprising to note that an 
exit from agriculture has coexisted with weak structural change in the aggregate. Finally, the 
fact that agriculture in Punjab also experienced the highest amount of within-sector productivity 
change across all sectors and states (the result of healthy productivity growth and the large 
employment share of agriculture) serves to emphasize that poverty reduction requires not just 
an improvement in agricultural productivity. It also requires the emergence of modern, labor-
intensive sectors that will make up for the exit of the workforce from agriculture. 
 
C. The Determinants of Structural Change 
 
29. We conclude with an attempt to shed exploratory light on the policy or policy-amenable 
factors that may influence the extent of structural change—the component of productivity growth 
that Table 2 shows is more strongly associated poverty reduction. We consider the initial 
employment shares in agriculture, initial education levels (in terms of average number of years 
of schooling), and indicators of labor market regulations, product market regulations, and 
financial development at the state level.33 Initial employment shares in agriculture can be looked 
upon as capturing the potential for structural change in a state, since a larger initial share of 
workers engaged in low productivity agriculture implies a larger share of workers who can 
reallocate out of agriculture. Similarly, since education is widely believed to provide workers 
greater occupational mobility, states with a higher initial share of educated workers can be 
expected to experience greater structural change. Finally, states with better developed financial 
systems, more competitive product markets, and greater labor market flexibility are likely to  
be those with a more dynamic economic environment, allowing for a greater reallocation  
of resources from one economic activity to another. They may therefore be more likely  
                                               
32
  Dehejia and Panagariya, 2012. 
33
  Along the lines of McMillan and Rodrik. 
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to experience growth-enhancing structural change. As with the measures of poverty and 
productivity, details on these variables are provided in the Appendix.  
 
30. Table 3 provides the results of our exploratory regression analysis. Each of the columns 
of the table includes as explanatory variables the initial share of workers in agriculture and 
workers years’ of education. While the coefficient on average years of schooling fails to be 
statistically significant, that on the initial share of agriculture is significant across some of the 
specifications. It is positive in both instances, consistent with the idea that the variable captures 
the potential for structural change. Turning to the variables capturing elements of the investment 
climate, each is positive and statistically significant when introduced one at a time. The results 
suggest that states with better developed financial systems, more competitive product markets, 
and greater labor market flexibility experience faster structural change. When introduced 
simultaneously, however, it is only the financial development variable that retains its statistical 
significance. This should not be too surprising, however, since our labor market and product 
market regulation indicators pertain mainly to the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, the 
financial development variable used here captures the state of financial development for the 
state as a whole.  
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Table 3: The Determinants of Structural Change 
  
Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of Structural Change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.0234 –0.0535** –0.0208 0.0171 –0.0555* 
 [0.816] [–2.538] [–0.763] [0.715] –2.193] 
      
Initial Employment –0.0138 0.0506** 0.0283 0.0018 0.0541** 
Share in Agriculture [–0.418] [2.341] [0.944] [0.065] [2.264] 
      
Initial Average Years  –0.0010 0.0018 0.0032 –0.0020 0.0027 
of Schooling [–0.349] [1.092] [1.168] [–0.804] [1.196] 
      
Index of Financial  0.0051***   0.0043** 
Development  [5.427]   [2.967] 
      
Index of Labor   0.0106**  0.0034 
Market Flexibility   [2.883]  [0.973] 
      
Index of Product     0.0054** 0.0001 
Market Competition    [2.542] [0.041] 
      
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.0145 0.7320 0.4387 0.3793 0.7594 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ Estimates. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
31. Our review of recent empirical studies and our analysis of the links between growth, 
structural transformation, and poverty reduction lead us to note the following. First, viewed  
from the perspective of poverty reduction, growth in India has been inclusive. However, as 
comparisons with the experiences of East and Southeast Asian economies reveal, there 
appears to be considerable scope to increase the impact of growth on poverty reduction in 
India.  
 
32. Second, while India’s relatively weak performance in improving the health and 
educational status of its population may well be an important factor in explaining the muted link 
between growth and poverty reduction, as highlighted by previous literature, India’s specific 
pattern of structural transformation is likely to have played an important role. In particular, 
significant reductions in the share of aggregate output contributed by agriculture—a sector that 
employed more than two thirds of India’s labor force as recently as the 1980s and continues to 
employ around a half today—have taken place without significant increases in the productivity of 
agriculture and expansion of output in sectors with high potential to employ semiskilled workers 
productively, such as modern, labor-intensive manufacturing.   
 
33. Indeed, the results of this paper indicate that the latter process, especially the 
reallocation of workers from lower to higher productivity sectors—and referred to as growth 
enhancing structural change by recent literature—is intimately connected to poverty reduction. 
States with the best performance in poverty reduction over 1987-2009 (such as Tamil Nadu, 
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Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh) have tended to be precisely the ones registering a high 
degree of structural change. Conversely, states with the weakest track record in poverty 
reduction (such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Assam) have tended to be the ones registering 
a low degree of structural change.   
 
34. Particularly instructive is the comparison between Bihar and Karnataka. Judged by the 
metric of within-sector productivity growth, Bihar’s performance was the better of the two. 
However, of the reallocation of workers that took place across sectors, very little was from lower 
to significantly higher productivity sectors in Bihar. In fact, Bihar ranked 14th out of 15 states in 
terms of the extent of structural change, leading its overall productivity growth to be among  
the lowest of the 15 states. In contrast, structural change in Karnataka was the strongest in  
the country, leading the state to register a decent growth rate in aggregate productivity (6th out 
of 15 states) and 3rd best performance in poverty reduction (4.3% reduction annually in its 
poverty rate). 
 
35. Third, our exploratory analysis of the drivers of structural change suggests that better 
functioning credit markets, competitive business regulations, and relatively flexible labor 
regulations are associated with a larger reallocation of labor from lower to higher productivity 
sectors. These findings are consistent with the view that a better investment climate is not only 
good for business, it is also an important means for making growth more pro-poor in a labor 
abundant country. By highlighting the importance of reallocation of resources to both growth and 
poverty reduction, the findings of this paper strongly suggest the need for more micro-oriented 
research, for example, using firm-level data, on the links between different types of economic 
policies and the decisions of economic agents on entry and exit across and within sectors of 
production and how these decisions influence employment opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
We describe here the data used in our analysis of state-level productivity growth, structural 
change, and poverty reduction over the time period 1987–1988 to 2009–2010. As noted earlier, 
we work with 15 major states of India defined in terms of their pre-2000 state boundaries.34  
 
Poverty 
 
Our measure of (absolute consumption) poverty is the poverty rate, i.e., the proportion of the 
population living below a given poverty line. We use the state-specific poverty lines developed 
by the Expert Group 2009 (Government of India, 2009) for the years 1993–1994, 2004–2005, 
and 2009–2010 (as updated by the Indian Planning Commission following the recommendations 
of the Expert Group). These poverty lines are then applied to the large-scale or quinquennial-
round consumer expenditure surveys carried out by the National Sample Survey Organisation 
(NSSO) to obtain combined poverty rates for both rural and urban areas in the fifteen major 
states that we consider in our analysis.35 Owing to the controversy surrounding the NSSO’s 
consumer expenditure survey for 1999–2000 (on account of side-by-side placement of 7- and 
30-day recall periods for consumption items in the survey questionnaire), we drop this year from 
our analysis entirely.36  
 
However, given that the starting year for our analysis is 1987–1988 we are still left with the  
task of estimating the poverty rates for this year. To do so, we follow Cain, Hasan, and Mitra  
in extending the Expert Group’s poverty lines back to 1987–1988. Cain, Hasan, and Mitra  
use Deaton’s Fischer price indexes for 1993–1994 relative to 1987–198837 to translate the 
Expert Group’s state and sector specific poverty lines for 1993–1994 to come up with their 
corresponding 1987–1988 values. They then use these poverty lines against the expenditure 
data reported in the 1987–1988 consumer expenditure survey to estimate poverty rates in that 
year. Cain, Hasan, and Mitra follow the procedures of the Expert Group so that, rather than use 
household expenditures reported on a uniform 30-day basis for their computations, they use 
‘mixed reference period’ expenditures whereby the 30-day expenditures for high-frequency 
consumption items (food, fuels, etc.) are combined with 365-day expenditures for low-frequency 
consumption items (clothing, footwear and durables) duly prorated to 30 days.38 Tables A1 and 
A2 describe the state-specific poverty lines and poverty rates used in this paper. 
                                               
34
  The states covered in this study includes Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal. To maintain consistency in state 
boundaries over time, the newer states of Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand have been 
merged with the states from which they were carved out, i.e., Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar 
Pradesh, respectively. 
35
  Combined rural and urban poverty estimates for any given state are simple averages of the 
corresponding rural and urban poverty estimates, each weighted by the sector’s share in the combined 
population (as derived from the consumer expenditure survey data).  
36
  See Cain, Hasan, and Mitra (2010) for a detailed summary of the debates surrounding poverty lines in 
India. Also see Deaton (2003). 
37
  Deaton 2003. 
38
  The Expert Group’s procedures for estimating poverty in 1993–1994, 2004–2005 and 2009–2010 rely 
on monthly per capita expenditures based on a ‘mixed reference period’ of 365 days for ‘low 
frequency’ items of consumption (pro-rated to 30 days and covering clothing, footwear, durables, and 
expenditures on education and health (institutional)) and 30 days for the remaining items, including 
food. The consumer expenditure survey for 1987–1988 collected expenditures on a 365-day basis for 
three of the low frequency groups, i.e., clothing, footwear and durables; education and health 
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expenditures were only collected on a 30-day basis. However, this is unlikely to raise serious 
comparability issues vis-à-vis the other two rounds since the weight of these items in total 
consumption expenditures is not very high.   
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Table A1: Poverty Lines 
 Round 43 Round 50 Round 61 Round 66 
 1987–1988 1993–1994 2004–2005 2009–2010 
State Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Andhra 
Pradesh 138.9 159.2 244.1 282.0 433.4 563.2 693.8 926.4 
Assam 153.4 172.7 266.3 306.8 478.0 600.0 691.7 871.0 
Bihar 147.8 161.7 236.1 266.9 433.4 526.2 655.6 775.3 
Chhattisgarh   229.1 283.5 398.9 513.7 617.3 806.7 
Gujarat 163.8 193.9 279.4 320.7 501.6 659.2 725.9 951.4 
Jharkhand   227.7 304.1   404.79 531.3 616.3 831.2 
Haryana 168.7 175.7 294.1 312.1 529.4 626.4 791.6 975.4 
Karnataka 152.4 166.6 266.9 294.8 417.8 588.1 629.4 908.0 
Kerala 166.5 166.9 286.5 289.2 537.3 584.7 775.3 830.7 
Madhya 
Pradesh 135.3 160.7 232.5 274.5 408.4 532.3 631.9 771.7 
Maharashtra 155.5 181.9 268.6 329.0 484.9 632.9 743.7 961.1 
Orissa 136.1 166.4 224.2 279.3 407.8 497.3 567.1 736.0 
Punjab 150.5 183.0 286.9 342.3 543.5 642.5 830.0 960.8 
Rajasthan 163.0 174.9 271.9 300.5 478.0 568.2 755.0 846.0 
Tamil Nadu 150.7 169.2 252.6 288.2 441.7 559.8 639.0 800.8 
Uttar 
Pradesh 145.5 170.1 244.3 281.3 435.1 532.1 663.7 799.9 
Uttaranchal   249.5 306.7 486.2 602.4 719.5 898.6 
West Bengal 141.4 173.0 235.5 295.2 445.4 572.5 643.2 830.6 
Notes: Poverty lines are drawn from Amoranto and Hasan (2010) and Cain, Hasan, and Mitra (2010) for the 43rd 
round and Government of India (2009 and 2012) for the 50th, 61st
,
 and 66th rounds. State and sector specific poverty 
lines are used in conjunction with NSS consumer expenditure survey data to obtain poverty rates for each state as a 
whole (i.e., rural + urban).  
 
Table A2: Poverty Rates 
 1987–1988 1993–1994 2004–2005 2009–2010 
Andhra Pradesh 51.8 44.6 29.7 21.1 
Assam 54.0 51.8 34.5 37.9 
Bihar 68.8 60.5 52.2 50.3 
Gujarat 52.9 37.8 31.7 23.0 
Haryana 33.4 36.0 24.1 20.1 
Karnataka 61.5 49.5 33.4 23.6 
Kerala 50.4 31.3 19.6 12.0 
Madhya Pradesh 55.3 46.4 48.9 40.7 
Maharashtra 54.5 47.9 38.3 24.5 
Orissa 62.6 59.1 57.2 37.0 
Punjab 22.5 22.4 20.9 15.9 
Rajasthan 54.7 38.3 34.4 24.8 
Tamil Nadu 54.2 44.8 29.4 17.1 
Uttar Pradesh 59.9 47.7 40.5 36.7 
West Bengal 51.9 39.4 34.2 26.7 
Notes: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh are defined in terms of their pre-2000 boundaries (and thus 
include Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Uttaranchal, respectively). Source: Cain, Hasan, and Mitra (2010) for 1987 and 
Government of India (2009 and 2012) for the years 1993, 2004, and 2009. 
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Output 
 
Our data on state domestic product and its sectoral composition is from the Central Statistical 
Organisation (CSO), Government of India. We organize the real sectoral output data into eleven 
broad sectors, namely: (i) agriculture and allied activities, (ii) mining and quarrying, (iii) registered 
manufacturing, (iv) unregistered manufacturing, (v) construction, (vi) public utilities that include 
electricity, water supply and gas, (vii) transport, storage and communications, (viii) wholesale and 
retail trade; hotels and restaurants, (ix) finance, insurance and real estate, (x) government 
services, and (xi) community, personal and social services. The data on output from 1983–1984 
to 2009–2010 is available for four different base years: 1980–1981, 1993–1994, 1999–2000 and 
2004–2005 with several overlapping years across different bases. To arrive at a uniform base, 
2004–2005 in our study, we create linking factors at the sector level. These linking factors are 
based on the average ratios of sector output available over the common years.  
 
Employment  
 
We use the employment–unemployment surveys of the NSSO for the years 1987–1988, 1993–
1994, 2004–2005, and 2009–2010 to get estimates of employment across industries and states. 
We follow the principal usual activity status to determine employment status and the national 
industrial classification code corresponding to the usual status to determine the broad sector of 
employment for the worker. Principal usual status defines the employed as those who (i) work  
in household enterprises, i.e., self-employed or own account workers; (ii) work as helpers i 
n household enterprises (unpaid family workers); (iii) work for regular salaries or wages; and 
(iv) work as casual wage earners. We consider workers of all ages.  
 
We supplement the information from the employment–unemployment surveys with data on 
employment in registered manufacturing from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).39 This 
addition is crucial for constructing real value added and employment data separately for the 
registered manufacturing and unregistered manufacturing. Since the NSSO employment–
unemployment survey data gives us employment figures for the manufacturing sector as a 
whole, we compute employment numbers for unregistered manufacturing by subtracting 
registered manufacturing employment (ASI) from total manufacturing employment (NSSO). In 
doing this exercise, we are careful to match and harmonize the data across years and data 
sources, using the National Industry Classification (NIC) codes so that a consistency in 
definitions of the broad sectors is maintained throughout. Table A3 describes the NIC codes 
used in various NSSO survey rounds. Table A4 explains how we have harmonized NIC codes 
for the ten broad industry groups (at the two-digit level of classification).  
 
  
                                               
39
  ASI time series data (1998-99 to 2007-08) is available at: 
http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/asi/ASI 
_main.htm?status=1&menu_id=88. ASI unit level data is used for computing employment figures in 
registered manufacturing for 1987 and 1993.  
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Table A3: National Industry Classifications across National Sample Survey Rounds 
Round Year NIC Classification 
38 1983 1970 
43 1987–1988 1970 
50 1993–1994 1987 
55 1999–2000 1998 
61 2004–2005 1998 
66 2009–2010 2004 
NIC = National Industry Classifications. 
Source:  Various National Sample Survey Organization Reports 
 
Table A4: Harmonizing National Industry Classification Codes over Time  
at the Two-Digit Level 
Name of Broad 
Industry Group Industry 
Round 43 
NIC 1970 
Round 50 
NIC 1987 
Round 61 
NIC 1998 
Round 66 
NIC 2004 
Harmonized 
Industry 
Code 
Agriculture and 
Allied Industries 
(Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing) AG 0 0 01,02 & 05 01,02 & 05 1 
Mining and 
Quarrying MIN 1 1 10 to 14 10 to 14 2 
Manufacturing MFG 2 & 3 2 & 3 15 to 37 15 to 37 3 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water PU 4 4 40&41 40&41 4 
Construction CONST 5 5 45 45 5 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade: 
Restaurants and 
Hotels WRT 6 6 
50 to 52 & 
55 
50 to 52 & 
55 6 
Transport, Storage 
and 
Communications TSC 7 7 60 to 64 60 to 64 7 
Finance, 
Insurance, Real 
Estate FIRE 8 8 
65 to 67 & 
70 to 74 
65 to 67 & 
70 to 74 8 
Public 
Administration; 
Government 
Services GOV 90 90 75 75 9 
Community, Social 
and Personal 
Services CSP 91 to 99 91 to 99 
80,85,90 to 
93 & 95 
80,85,90 to 
93 & 95 10 
Source: Various National Sample Survey Organization Reports 
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Other Variables 
 
We capture initial conditions in states through the 1987 share of employment in agriculture and 
average number of years of schooling among the employed. For constructing the initial average 
number of years of schooling, we closely follow Cain, Hasan, Magsombol, and Tandon (2010). 
Table A5 generates a variable denoting the number of years of schooling corresponding to each 
general education code in the 43rd NSSO survey round. Information on other rounds is provided 
for reference. We restrict our attention to those defined as employed on a principal activity 
status basis and construct our average years of education over this group.  
 
Table A5: Concordance of Education Categories across National Sample Survey Rounds and 
Number of Years of Education 
Round 43 Round 50 Round 61 Round 66 
Harmonized 
Codes 
Number of 
Years of 
Education 
Code Description Code Description Code Description Code Description   
0 not literate 1 not literate 1 not literate 1 not literate 1= Below 
Primary 
0 
1 literate w/o 
formal 
schooling 
2 literate 
through 
attending 
NFEC/AEC 
2 literate through 
attending 
EGS/NFEC/AEC 
2 literate 
through 
attending 
EGS/NFEC/ 
AEC 
 1 
  3 TLC 3 TLC 3 TLC  1 
  4 Others 4 Others 4 Others  1 
2 literate but 
below 
primary 
5 literate but 
below  
5 literate but below 
primary 
5 literate but 
below 
primary 
 2.5 
   primary       
3 primary 6 primary 6 primary 6 primary 2 = Primary 5 
4 middle 7 middle 7 middle 7 middle  8 
5 secondary 8 secondary 8 secondary 8 secondary 3 = 
Secondary 
12 
  9 higher 
secondary 
10 Higher 
secondary 
10 Higher 
secondary 
 12 
    11 Diploma/certifica
te course 
11 Diploma/certi
ficate course 
 12 
7 Graduate 
and above 
in 
engineering
/technology 
11 Graduate 
and above 
in 
engineering
/technology 
12 or 
13 
Graduate/ 
Postgraduate 
and above 
12 or 
13 
Graduate/ 
Postgraduate 
and above 
4 = Tertiary 
and Above 
15 
8 Graduate 
and above 
in medicine 
12 Graduate 
and above 
in medicine 
     15 
9 Graduate 
and above 
in  other 
subjects 
13 Graduate 
and above 
in other 
subjects 
     15 
Note: AEC = Adult Education Centres; EGS = Education Guarantee Scheme; NFEC = Non-formal Education 
Courses; TLC = Total Literacy Campaign.  
Source: Cain, Hasan, Magsombol, and Tandon (2010) and authors’ estimates 
 
To capture the state-level policy environment, we consider measures of labor market flexibility, 
product market competition (PMR), and financial development (FINDEV). These measures are 
taken from Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007); Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009); and Cain, 
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Hasan, and Mitra, respectively.40 Table A6 reports the values taken for these and the initial 
conditions variables. 
 
Table A6: State Characteristics 
State 
Initial 
Employment 
Shares in 
Agriculture 
(1987) 
Initial 
average 
years of 
schooling 
(1987) 
Labor Market 
Regulations 
(FLEX) 
Product 
Market 
Regulations 
(PMR) 
Initial Level  
of Financial 
Development 
(1987) 
(FINDEV) 
Andhra Pradesh 0.67 2.02 1   0 6.39 
Assam 0.70 3.83 0 –1 2.69 
Bihar 0.74 2.47 0 –1 3.37 
Gujarat 0.56 3.48 1   0 5.67 
Haryana 0.57 4.02 0   1 6.09 
Karnataka 0.66 3.03 1   1 7.04 
Kerala 0.47 5.72 0   0 6.66 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.77 2.13 0 –1 5.09 
Maharashtra 0.63 3.70 1   1 6.42 
Orissa 0.68 2.27 0 –1 4.49 
Punjab 0.52 4.51 0   1 4.65 
Rajasthan 0.64 1.94 1 –1 4.97 
Tamil Nadu 0.51 3.52 1   1 7.78 
Uttar Pradesh 0.70 2.86 0   0 4.10 
West Bengal 0.52 3.73 0 –1 4.91 
Notes: 1. Labor market flexibility measure (FLEX) is based on Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2007); 1 refers to 
flexible and 0 refers to inflexible labor regulations. 2. Product Market Regulations (PMR) measure is based on Gupta, 
Hasan and Kumar (2009); 1 refers to competitive, 0 refers to neutral and –1 refers to cumbersome product market 
regulations. 3. Financial Development (FINDEV) is interpolated for 1987 and is based on the Financial Infrastructure 
Development Index (for years between 1971–1972 and 1997–1998) quoted in Ghosh and De (2004). Larger values 
of FINDEV represent states with a relatively well-developed financial system. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
40
  These papers use information and indexes created by a number of other researchers and studies 
including Besley and Burgess (2004) on labor regulations; OECD (2007) and World Bank (2004) on 
product market regulations and the investment climate, respectively; and Ghosh and De (2004) on 
financial development across India’s states. Ghosh and De construct an index of states’ financial 
development using information from 1981 to 1997 on credit-to-deposit ratios in nationalized banks, 
share of state tax revenue in net state domestic product, and the number of post offices per 10,000 of 
the population. 
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